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Applying a New Management Model in the Joint Staff:  
An Executive Summary 
Francois Melese ∗ 
Introduction 
Agencies throughout the federal government face the same basic set of management 
challenges: accountability, or tracking government spending on inputs; efficiency, or 
minimizing the costs of government activities; and effectiveness, or measuring out-
puts/outcomes and tying budgets to performance. A key objective in shifting govern-
ment’s focus from inputs to activities/outputs is to promote more robust cost-effective-
ness analyses to improve agency investments and support Congressional decision 
making.1 
The challenge is that, at best, most Department of Defense (DoD) accounting sys-
tems track expenditures on inputs. Many were neither designed nor intended to report 
expenditures by activities or outputs. This challenge is especially acute for activities 
that cut across military services, like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint 
Exercise Program (JEP). To assist the Joint Staff to address these challenges, an on-
going project commissioned by the Joint Staff Comptroller leverages a new integrated 
public management model called the “Super-Unified Customer and Cost Evaluation 
Strategic System” (SUCCESS).2 Guided by SUCCESS, the J7/JEP and Joint Staff 
Comptroller teams are currently integrating and mapping U.S. Air Force, Navy, and 
Army data by individual exercise. This ongoing initiative is building a foundation for 
future analysis and evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of joint exercise ac-
tivities. 
Resting on fundamental micro-economic and accounting principles, SUCCESS in-
tegrates three widely used business management frameworks that underpin many 
                                                           
∗ Dr. Francois Melese is a Professor of Economics in the Defense Resources Management 
Institute at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He would like to thank the 
Joint Staff Comptroller and J7/JEP team for their patience in guiding him through the intri-
cacies of the Joint Exercise Program. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of 
the author, and the usual disclaimers apply. A version of this article previously appeared as 
Francois Melese and D. Savage, “SUCCESS: Applying a New Management Model in the 
Joint Staff,” Armed Forces Comptroller 53:1 (Winter 2008): 33-38. 
1 Chief Financial Officers Act (1990 CFO Act), and Government Performance and Results Act 
(1993 GPRA). 
2 Francois Melese, James Blandin, and Sean O’Keefe, “A New Management Model for Gov-
ernment: Integrating Activity-Based Costing, the Balanced Scorecard and Total Quality 




commercial Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 3 applications, together with the Plan-
ning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). These include: 
• Activity-Based Costing (ABC) 4 
• The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 5 
• Total Quality Management (TQM: Lean, Six Sigma, etc.), captured here primarily 
through the Shewhart-Deming “PLAN-DO-CHECK-ACT” cycle of continuous im-
provement (PDCA).6 
PPBS was originally designed as a high-level management information system to 
facilitate constrained optimization to achieve a form of “allocative efficiency” within 
DoD—that is, to maximize national security subject to fiscal constraints. As originally 
conceived, PPBS was meant to assist senior defense officials to establish activity/ out-
put (or “capability”) priorities within the budget, and to shift financial resources and 
guide investments among defense programs—and across the military services—from 
less to more productive uses in response to changes in the national security environ-
                                                           
3 A descendent of the management information systems (MIS) and Material Resource Plan-
ning (MRP) movements, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) was initially led by SAP, a 
German software company. Today, multiple suppliers including IBM, Microsoft, PeopleSoft, 
Baan, Seibel, and others offer ERP applications designed to streamline and integrate opera-
tion processes and information flows in a company to increase productivity and cut costs. 
These customized software solutions apply the latest database, reporting and analysis tools in 
an attempt to measure, monitor and integrate various functional areas like manufacturing, 
sales and marketing, distribution, customer service, accounts payable/ receivable, purchasing, 
inventory and material planning, human resources, financial accounting, asset management, 
project scheduling, etc.  
4  See H. Thomas Johnson and Robert S. Kaplan, Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Man-
agement Accounting (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987); James A. Brimson and 
Callie Berliner, eds., Cost Management for Today’s Advanced Manufacturing (Boston: Har-
vard Business School Press, 1988); and Steve Player and Carol Cobble, Cornerstones of 
Decision Making: Profiles of Enterprise ABM (Greensboro, NC: Oakhill Press, 1999). 
5  See Robert Kaplan and David Norton, “The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Per-
formance,” Harvard Business Review (Jan.–Feb. 1992): 71–80; Kaplan and Norton, “Using 
the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management System,” Harvard Business Review (Jan–
Feb 1996): 75–85; Kaplan and Norton, The Balanced Scorecard (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1996); and Kaplan and Norton, The Strategy Focused Organization (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2001). 
6 See W. Edwards Deming, Out of Crisis (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Center for Advanced Engi-
neering Study, 1986); and Peter Senge, “Looking Ahead: Implications of the Present,” Har-
vard Business Review (Sept.–Oct. 1997): An important consequence of the PDCA cycle 
through SUCCESS is that it emphasizes continuous monitoring and evaluation of customer-
driven measures of performance, along with costs/budgets, to reveal returns on investments. 
This results in an ongoing evaluation of planned vs. actual budgets and planned vs. actual 
performance/effectiveness, which completes the closed-loop feedback cycle built into 
SUCCESS. 
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ment.7 As one Department of Defense report put it, “The ultimate objective of PPBS 
shall be to provide … operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equip-
ment and support attainable within fiscal constraints.”8 
Today, a new emphasis on “execution” is reflected in a new name: PPBE. A “capa-
bilities-based” PPBE process is currently being implemented to make high-level de-
fense resource allocation decisions for DoD that culminate in the annual defense 
budget submitted by the President to Congress. SUCCESS offers a lower-level inte-
grated public management model that supports this effort and captures the spirit of 
PPBE. 
SUCCESS was first applied to generate fresh insights into two ongoing U.S. federal 
management initiatives: the Congressionally-mandated “Government Performance and 
Results Act” (GPRA), and the “President’s Management Agenda.”9 Subsequently, 
SUCCESS provided a conceptual model that helped guide the development and 
evaluation of the new PPBE process in DoD’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR).10  
This executive summary reviews a longer study that reports on an ongoing pilot 
program initiated by the Joint Staff Comptroller to implement the SUCCESS frame-
work to support J7 (Operational Plans & Interoperability) in managing the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s two-hundred-million-dollar “Joint Exercise Program” 
(JEP).11 The success of this effort could serve as a template for other organizations in 
the Joint Staff and throughout the Department of Defense. The next sections introduce 
SUCCESS and offer a brief background and review of the model through its applica-
tion to the Joint Staff’s Joint Exercise Program. 
Leveraging SUCCESS and PPB to Study the Joint Exercise Program (JEP) 
The Joint Staff’s FY 2008 Budget Highlights describes the Joint Exercise Program 
(JEP) as “the Chairman and Combatant Commanders’ principal vehicle for achieving 
joint and multinational training.”12 In a section of the latest QDR entitled “Build the 
Right Skills,” the focus is on “[m]aintaining the capabilities required to conduct effec-
tive multi-dimensional joint operations [including] battlefield integration with inter-
agency partners and combined operations—the integration of the joint force and coali-
tion forces....”13 
                                                           
7 Allen Schick, “The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform,” Public Administration Re-
view (December 1966). 
8 Department of Defense Document 7045.14 (22 May 1984). 
9 See Melese, Blandin, & O’Keefe, “A New Management Model for Government.” 
10 QDR Integrated Product Team (IPT) #5 Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 2005; Don-
ald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006). 
11 A full version of the report is available upon request from the author, at fmelese@nps.edu. 
12 Joint Staff Comptroller, “The Joint Staff, FY 2008 Budget Highlights,” (March 2007), 19. 
13 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, 77. 
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The Joint Education and Training Division of J7 (Operational Plans & Joint Force 
Development) manages JEP. The Joint Staff’s exercise budget funds only the trans-
portation of personnel and equipment to worldwide exercises. J7 manages the strategic 
transportation program, while the Joint Staff Comptroller is responsible for funding 
strategic lift for the exercises. At the level at which J7 operates, the key players are: 
• The Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) 
• The U.S. Transportation Command USTRANSCOM, which includes the Air Mo-
bility Command (AMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Surface 
Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) 
• The branches of the armed services 
• J7/JEP 
• The Joint Staff Comptroller. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships of each of these key players within the context 
of the SUCCESS model. It also reveals key linkages between PPBS and SUCCESS as 
it applies to JEP. 
The different responsibilities and perspectives of each key player (COCOM, US-
TRANSCOM, and J7) are reviewed and interpreted below in the context of the SUC-
CESS model illustrated in Figure 1. Applying the PPBS Cycle described in JEP’s “Co-
ordination Procedures” offers valuable insights in the context of SUCCESS.14 
Planning 
The first loop through the SUCCESS process is launched with a planning phase, where 
defense planning and fiscal guidance prompts a review by COCOMs of their missions, 
goals, and objectives for JEP. That is, this is the phase where COCOMs determine 
what it is they will do. The Customers in this context are the COCOMs who have a de-
rived demand for strategic lift to support their planned exercises. 
Programming 
The subsequent “do” phase in SUCCESS corresponds to the programming phase in 
PPB. In this phase, organizations review existing activities and identify incremental 
adjustments and investments in their processes and/or products (capabilities), in order 
to “supply” services that respond to the planning guidance. In short, if the planning 
phase identifies “what to do,” the programming phase outlines “how to do it.” For JEP, 
the production and supply of strategic lift is largely in the hands of USTRANSCOM. 
They combine available inputs (military aircraft, ships, commercial charters, etc.) to 
produce strategic lift outputs (transport capabilities) required by the COCOMs. 
 
                                                           
14 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, J-7, Joint Training Manual for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, CJCSM 3500.03A (1 September 2002), Enclosure L. 
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Figure 1: SUCCESS for JEP—A PPB Perspective 
 
Budgeting 
The “check” phase in the first loop through SUCCESS requires organizations to de-
velop budget estimates that are eventually rolled up into the Program Objectives 
Memoranda (POM) of the services, defense agencies, and Joint Staff. After being vet-
ted at different levels, these program proposals ultimately find their way into defense 
budget estimates included as budget estimate submissions (BES) in the President’s de-
fense budget submitted to Congress. The estimated input costs for JEP make up the 
strategic transportation budget that is the primary responsibility of J7 and the Joint 
Staff Comptroller. 
New Insights from Activity-Based Costing (ABC) 
The first step in applying Activity Based Costing/Budgeting (a key pillar in the “do” 
phase of SUCCESS) to the Joint Exercise Program is to recognize that the “activities” 
being considered are joint exercises. The next step is to recognize the three distinct 
perspectives of the three key players. The perspectives of the COCOM (customer), J7 
(payer), and USTRANSCOM (producer/supplier) are illustrated in Figure 2 as three 
matrices (of activities on inputs) in the context of the first (PPB) loop through SUC-
CESS. Cascading down these matrices reveals the “planned budget” for strategic lift 
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Figure 2: Planned Budget Perspectives for COCOM, J7, and USTRANSCOM 
 
COCOM Perspective 
The first and highest level (“Effectiveness”) perspective is that of the COCOM cus-
tomers. Any attempt to increase effectiveness at this level involves an (implicit) con-
strained optimization: maximizing joint and combined troop capabilities through 
training exercises, subject to fiscal constraints. The solution requires an evaluation of 
the marginal benefits and costs of expanding (or funding) one exercise relative to an-
other. This requires estimating the total costs of an exercise and combining this data 
with some measure of effectiveness for each exercise. Note that in the top matrix of 
Figure 2, the strategic lift (transportation) column of the total costs of an exercise is a 
J7 and Joint Staff Comptroller responsibility. The total strategic lift budget for a given 
year is simply the sum of the entries in that column. The current J7/JEP–SUCCESS 
initiative involves an effort to combine and integrate data across the services to facili-
tate the collection of strategic lift cost data by exercise. The top matrix in Figure 2 of-
fers the Joint Staff a way to focus on how J7’s efforts might contribute to and facilitate 
a higher level of optimization. The challenge is to combine timely, accurate, and com-
plete strategic lift cost data with other joint exercise costs (personnel, equipment, etc.) 
to support cost-effectiveness evaluations of joint exercises to globally optimize force 
capabilities. 
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J7/JEP Perspective 
The second, lower-level perspective is also the most relevant to J7 and the Joint Staff 
Comptroller. The middle matrix in Figure 2 breaks strategic lift into its various com-
ponents. In order to identify the strategic lift costs of each exercise, J7/JEP must cap-
ture the complete costs of airlift, sealift, inland transportation, port handling, etc. 
across all the services involved in a particular exercise. To complete the cells of this 
matrix and build a budget for strategic lift, J7 must first obtain estimates from the CO-
COMs of the number of passengers (#pax) and amount of cargo to be transported to 
support their joint exercises. Cost estimates can be generated by multiplying the ex-
pected number of passengers and amount of cargo by a forecast of an average total 
(unit) cost or price per passenger or cargo mile ($/passenger/mile or $/cargo/mile) ob-
tained from USTRANSCOM.15 
To improve cost transparency in the management of joint exercises, accounting 
systems need to report total costs of program inputs (CTP, airlift, sealift, inland trans-
portation, port handling, etc.) by individual exercise.16 Some initial results of J7’s data 
collection efforts are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Where can J7 get its biggest return from efficiencies? 
Figure 3: Total Costs by Transportation Category 
 
                                                           
15 Recent dramatic increases in revolving fund rates (a 5.2 percent increase for FY2007, fol-
lowed by a 44.4 percent increase for FY2008) pose a significant challenge for efforts to fore-
cast future JEP costs/budgets. See President’s Budget 2/2007 for 2008–09, United States Air 
Force Working Capital Fund (WCF), Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates Overview 
(February 2007), 83; available at http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
070209-054.pdf.  
16 Some accounting systems currently report at the “program” input level, but mostly not by ex-
ercise. OSD reports at the highest level: CIF, ORF, & Misc. Services (the category that in-
cludes JEP). The military services report at a lower level, breaking Misc. Services into: CTP, 
PH, IT, etc., but most only report totals not broken down by individual joint exercise. 











Percentage 66% 18% 14% 3% 0%
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The costs illustrated in Figure 3 roughly correspond to the total cost categories distrib-
uted along the bottom row of the middle matrix in Figure 2. Examining the distribution 
of these costs over the different strategic lift components, it is clear that in FY2006 
over 80 percent of the strategic lift budget could be attributed to airlift and sealift. In 
fact, over 60 percent of the budget is due to airlift alone. 
Given the importance of airlift in the overall JEP budget, Figure 4 reveals the vari-
ous components (inputs) that make up airlift. It is clear from the data collected for 
FY2006 that commercial charter is by far the largest component of airlift costs. It is 
also the largest single component of overall spending on strategic lift. Whereas Figure 
3 reflects J7/JEP’s perspective, Figure 4 is more in line with USTRANSCOM’s per-
spective. 
 
Figure 4: Total Costs of Airlift by Category 
 
USTRANSCOM (AMC) Perspective 
Returning to Figure 2, the bottom matrix breaks airlift into its various components 
(similar to Figure 4). This Activity-Based Costing/Budgeting matrix for one activity—
airlift—illustrates the perspective of USTRANSCOM’s Air Mobility Command 
(AMC). This input–activity matrix offers an opportunity to identify more efficient sub-
stitution possibilities in the “internal business” (production function) component of 
SUCCESS (see Figure 1). 
Similar matrices could be constructed for sealift from the perspective of US-
TRANSCOM’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Surface Deployment and 
Distribution Command (SDDC). The constrained optimization problem facing US-
TRANSCOM is how to choose an optimum mix of airlift assets that minimizes the 
costs of satisfying transportation demands for each exercise. But this requires AMC to 
have data that reveal alternative possible mixes (technical efficiency, or the production 
function), and that supports an evaluation of those alternatives in the optimization 












Percentage 59% 22% 18% 1%
Commercial 
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AMC Aircraft CTP Obligated Channel Cargo
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ongoing J7/JEP-SUCCESS project. Another opportunity uncovered by the project is 
for more timely submissions by the COCOMs of accurate demand forecasts, which 
would increase the ability of the AMC to put commercial contracts out to competitive 
bid, which would in turn lower the overall costs of airlift. 
Leveraging SUCCESS+PPBE for JEP 
Historically, PPBS emphasized the equivalent of the preliminary (Planning, Program-
ming, and Budget estimation) loop through SUCCESS (depicted in Figure 1). In 2002, 
two major modifications to PPBS occurred.17 First, a shift to a two-year cycle was 
implemented. Second, an “execution” phase was added. The name was changed to 
PPBE to reflect the new emphasis on budget “execution” and the “evaluation” of re-
sults.18 The recent change to a two-year cycle in the PPBE process roughly corre-
sponds to two loops through the SUCCESS model illustrated in Figure 1. 
Execution and Evaluation 
The first loop of the PPB cycle illustrated in Figure 1 results in a “planned budget” 
submitted to Congress. After extensive review, Congress passes defense budget au-
thorization and appropriation bills that become law. These laws grant DoD “obligation 
authority” stating the maximum dollar amount of contracts, etc. that can be entered into 
in the budget year. The passage of these bills launches a second loop through SUC-
CESS. Whereas the first loop through SUCCESS (Figure 1) has a Planning, Program-
ming, and Budget estimation/forecasting focus, the second loop involves actual “exe-
cution”—converting inputs into outputs, or spending the defense budget on transport-
ing troops, equipment, etc.—and “evaluation”—producing transportation and training 
capabilities and evaluating outcomes. 
Working back up the three matrices in Figure 2 illustrates how actual expenditures 
could be rolled up to identify the realized strategic lift budget for joint exercises. This 
                                                           
17 In fact, three major modifications to PPB occurred within the Department of Defense in 
2002. First, a shift to a two-year cycle was implemented; second, there was a renewed em-
phasis on up-front decisions (the “Enhanced Planning Process”; SPG; JPG) to provide 
stronger guidance to the services; third, an “execution” phase was added. While Congress 
still appropriates the defense budget on an annual basis, DoD now commits to a two-year 
budget, partly to reduce redundant and costly program reviews. Arguably, the most signifi-
cant change is that in every even year (or “On-Year” of a two-year cycle), an attempt is now 
made to accomplish department-wide global optimization at the front end of the process in-
stead of at the back end. That is, an effort is made to make cross-service trade-offs early to 
guide the production of joint capabilities (outputs), and the corresponding program decisions 
on platforms and weapon systems (inputs). The theory is that if programs are “born joint” in-
stead of being cobbled together late in the process, this will improve “allocative efficiency” 
(increasing military effectiveness) and contribute to “operational efficiency” (cutting defense 
costs). 
18 U.S. Department of Defense, Management Initiative Decision 913, Implementation of a 2-
Year Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process (Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 22 May 2003). 
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results in an “actual budget” for strategic lift for JEP that can be compared with the 
“planned budget” to improve future forecasting. The differences that appear between 
planned and actual budgets for many COCOMs are significant. Revealing these differ-
ences could motivate investments to provide near-real-time data streams, and to im-
prove forecasts, so that scarce funds can be released for other pressing activities, such 
as expanding existing exercises or funding previously unfunded exercises. 
Continuously monitoring differences between planned and actual costs (and per-
formance) not only satisfies the spirit of GPRA, but can also help reveal returns on the 
nation’s defense investments. This has the potential to increase accountability, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness within the Department of Defense, and to result in more real-
istic budget estimates generated by the PPBE process. 
Conclusion 
A key challenge that faces federal agencies as they struggle to satisfy GPRA mandates 
is to adapt conventional business management, measurement, and accounting frame-
works to the public sector. The SUCCESS model is designed to help bridge the gap 
between business and government. Combined with appropriate incentives, implement-
ing a framework with these features could facilitate realization of the three chief aims 
of GPRA: to improve executive and congressional decision making, to promote better 
internal management of government programs, and to increase accountability to tax-
payers.19  
                                                           
19 GPRA 1993: Public Law 103-62. 
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